We study the set of non-U.S. companies that have used a reverse merger into the U.S. as a means to rent U.S. corporate law (and sometimes also as the vehicle to rent U.S. securities law). We find that those firms which pioneered the practice tended also to hire a Big Four Auditor and were less likely to rent Nevada's corporate law. Those firms that pioneered the practice exhibited better observable corporate governance outcomes than the firms which did reverse mergers in subsequent years. The later entrants were more likely to strategically mimic the early entrants just enough to gain access to the U.S. capital markets, but were shown over time to be more likely to have worse corporate governance outcomes. Interestingly, a substantial percentage of these reverse mergers over time involved the renting of Nevada's corporate law. Overall, the preliminary evidence supports the existence of strategic mimicry which the capital market does not totally discern for many years, as well as the explanatory power of reputational bonding for reconciling the fact that renting U.S. institutions can be used either to build reputation or to exploit relative weak, formal U.S. cross-border law enforcement.
I. Introduction
In the corporate governance literature, a long line of studies has noted that weak corporate governance institutions impede financial and economic development. One of the hotly contested questions in the literatures is the extent to which firms from countries with weak governance institutions can simply rent U.S. governance institutions and commit themselves to better corporate governance (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Siegel, 2005) . In that literature, there has been a debate between the concept of legal bonding (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999) , by which U.S. rules can effectively be enforced extraterritorially and the rent of U.S. institutions will significantly solve the weak institutions problem via formal U.S. law enforcement, and the concept of reputational bonding (Siegel, 2005) , by which the U.S. law enforcement is shown to be weak across borders and firms have to choose over time and during economic shocks whether they want to follow rules that are not being formally enforced with much efficacy.
Interestingly, the prior literature has tended to focus solely on cross-listings. Of all the bonding articles since 1999, nearly all if not all of them from Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) to Doidge et al. (2003) to Gande and Miller (2001) have been focused on cross-listings. This near if not entire focus of the literature on cross-listing probably dates back to the fact that the international finance literature has for several decades had a phenomenological interest in equities trading across national markets.
Still, if one really wants to know whether renting/borrowing/adopting U.S. institutions leads to a high uniform level of corporate governance, it seems odd that the literature has almost totally ignore the phenomenon of reverse mergers. Reverse mergers involving the renting of state-level corporate law, and it is state-level corporate law which is relatively even more focused on keeping insiders from stealing from their firms. While securities law gets at this issue via disclosure, corporate law gets at it directly via the content of the law and the mechanism (derivative actions) specifically designed to thwart insiders stealing from their firms.
Also, by focusing on reverse mergers, one can compare and contrast between the set of firms who rent only state-level corporate law and those that rent both state-level corporate law and U.S. federal securities law (by also listing their shares on a major U.S. stock exchange).
We find that cross-border reverse mergers into the U.S. have exhibited the following patterns. A majority of the open reverse mergers (those where the non-U.S. operating company clearly publicizes its foreign status) involve the renting of Nevada's corporate law. A majority of the cross-border reverse mergers involve Canadian and Chinese firms. A majority of the enforcement actions involve Chinese firms. Those firms that pioneered the reverse merger in earlier years and those firms which chose a Big 4 auditor were less likely to have negative corporate governance outcomes. Those outcomes are measured in a variety of ways. One broad proxy is the extent to which a firm files late annual reports to the SEC. We also look at formal enforcement actions and stock-market trading suspensions. Lastly, home-country institutions partially explain these same outcomes as well. Those firms from countries with relative better corporate governance have fewer negative corporate governance outcomes in the United States.
The patterns we find are systematically different from what we see in distant literatures that might otherwise provide a useful analogy. In sociology and organizational theory, there are two subliteratures which might first appear to provide useful analogies, but in the final analysis are markedly different. In neoinstitutional theory, an initial set of pioneers chooses a new practice because it is economically optimal for them to do so. Subsequently, a set of followers chooses that same new practice not because it is economic optimal to do so, but because a set of external resource providers and intermediaries forces them to do so. What we find is different from this, since there is no evidence that Chinese firms are being told by reputable intermediaries to rent Nevada's corporate law. Instead, they appear to be using it as a tactic to try and gain access to U.S. capital markets. In organizational theory, there is the concept of decoupling, by which firms will announce that they are going to adopt a practice demanded by the capital markets or other intermediaries, receive a stock-market bounce from the announcement, and then never actually implement the practice. Here, many of the reverse mergers are publicly showing their cards, so to speak, by producing public filings which lay out their practices in terms of which auditor was hired and which state's corporate law was rented. Therefore, in our context there is no such concealment of true practices being implemented. Also, while further analyses need to be done, our initial understanding is that the U.S. capital markets and formal U.S. law enforcement have taken years to distinguish among the different types of cross-border reverse mergers coming into the U.S., including by warning investors about the large number that go one to release sharply negative financial statements after their reverse merger.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section II provides a further review of the bonding literature. Section III provides some further background on the concept of crossborder reverse mergers. Section IV provides a description of the data we have collected to conduct the study. Section V presents the models and results. Section VI discusses those results further and concludes.
II. The Bonding Literature
We know from the last decade and a half of the corporate governance literature that institutions matter, and that weak corporate governance institutions lead to slower financial and economic development. Weak institutions have been shown to be associated with smaller stock markets, fewer large firms, fewer firms in industries dependent on outside finance, and weaker economic development.
The question then is whether firms can jump across institutional jurisdictions and commit to follow the stronger corporate governance institutions of other countries. This view was pioneered by Fuerst (1998) in a working paper, and then popularized by Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) .
The legal bonding scholars argue that U.S. formal law enforcement, either via the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or via private plaintiffs, can significantly solve the weak institutions problem. The argument is that foreign firms, in order to access to the U.S. equity markets, must agree to follow most if not all of the disclosure and legal liability requirements of U.S. federal securities law. Such disclosure and legal liability requirements make these firms subject to formal law enforcement by the SEC as well as private lawsuits. The fear of one or both forms of enforcement should significantly solve the weak institutions problem.
The legal bonding hypothesis has recently been the subject of much criticism for the weakness of its empirical evidence and the numerous unanswered questions that go with it.
First, there is the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Starting with Doidge et al. (2003) , few articles proposing legal bonding have attempted to effectively control for firm quality (especially unobserved firm quality) as the driving explanation for higher valuations among U.S. cross-listed foreign firms. Second, there is the problem of causality. Gande and Miller (2011) , for example, suggest that private lawsuits lead to firms suffering bad stock market outcomes.
Yet it is known from Siegel (2005) that private lawsuits are typically reacting to and not exposing public known theft and severe expropriation cases, which in turn are often discovered not via SEC forms but by those directly stolen from or directly aggrieved in ways that are readily observable.
In contrast, an alternative view of reputational bonding was proposed by Siegel (2005) and further extended in Siegel (2009) . This view states that that it is empirically shown to be difficult for the SEC and private plaintiffs to enforce U.S. securities laws across borders. One of the main challenges is the frequent inability to gather evidence necessary from home countries. Since the law is but weakly enforced formally, the market still grows however because firms can commit to following the law voluntarily and show themselves to be visibly following the law during an economic downturn or crisis, when insiders have been shown in the literature to have the greatest sudden temptation to move money illicitly to their own foreigncurrency-denominated bank accounts. The evidence from Siegel (2005) shows that a representative group of Mexican firms landed in a separating equilibrium the years after the 1994-95 Mexico crisis. Those who were even accused of a significant corporate governance violation were systematically cut off from subsequent access to the U.S. capital market. Those who went through the home-market crisis without being accused of a governance violation were given privileged long-term access to outside finance. This type of separating equilibrium, by which a majority follows the law despite the fact that formal law enforcement is known to be weak, can help explain why the market for cross-listings has continued to grow over the past decade.
Interestingly, the bonding literature has focused almost all of its attention on crosslistings even though U.S. institutions can be rented in multiple ways and the manner most applicable to the bonding hypothesis is the renting of U.S. state-level corporate law, either in isolation or together with the renting of U.S. federal securities law. Therefore it is necessary that we focus on whether reverse mergers lead to better corporate governance, and if so, which causal mechanisms (reputational bonding or formal legal bonding) better explain the success.
III. Cross-Border Reverse Mergers
A typical reverse merger has the following characteristics. A non-U.S. company seeks to rent U.S. state-level corporate law. It identifies a U.S. shell company already incorporated in a particular state. It then engineers a reverse merger transaction, at the end of which the non-U.S. company's controlling shareholder or shareholders control the U.S. shell company, which in turn owns the original non-U.S. company. As a result, the non-U.S. company is now owned formally by an entity that is bound by U.S. state-level corporate law.
There are likely two motivations for such cross-border reverse mergers. The non-U.S. company may be seeking to bond itself to stricter U.S. rules of corporate law, which go further than most countries' corporate law to ban self-dealing by owner-managers and to provide socalled derivative actions as a mechanism for the owner-managers to be sued in case of selfdealing. Alternatively, some of these reverse mergers may be used as an instrument for the owner-manager to engage in fraud. Specifically, if the non-U.S. firm is seeking to evade taxes in the home country it may structure transactions with the new U.S. parent so as to avoid taxes in the home country. Or at the same time, if the non-U.S. firm senses that a state such as Nevada has one of the lowest level in the U.S. of state employees per state population and is not able to strictly enforce its own corporate law, then perhaps the reverse merger could be used as a mechanism to exploit pockets of particular weakness in U.S. formal law enforcement.
IV. Data and Models

IV.A. Data
First, we gather data on cross-border reverse mergers into the U.S., when they took place, the foreign operating company's country of headquarters, and the U.S. state law being rented.
To compile this database we screen for cross-border mergers using Capital IQ and Thomson ONE Banker, then supplement these sources with a reverse mergers database created by Private Raise. We also use the SEC's online EDGAR database to identify entities with features common to reverse merger candidates. These included the use of "Acquisition" in the company name, registering as a small business issuer under section 12(g) of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, and filing a large 8-K form around the time of a name change.
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After assembling a list of likely foreign reverse merger companies, we review their SEC filings to determine whether the transaction was truly a cross-border merger. The database covers the years 1996-2010, since 1 8-K forms are filed to announce "entry into a material definitive agreement." The 8-K filed around the time of a reverse merger is usually called a "super 8-K," and contains details of the transaction. Reverse merger companies usually change their name and board members around the time of the transaction, so looking for large 8-K filings near the time of a name change typically indicates a significant change in control of the company, which could signal a reverse merger.
1996 was the first known year of a cross-border reverse merger from these sources.
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The "hiding reverse mergers" are identified by comparing the headquarter locations listed in Capital IQ and on the front page of SEC filings with the operations described in item 1 (description of business) of each firm's annual report. Companies whose main offices as reported to the SEC were in the United States, but whose sole operations are carried out by foreign subsidiaries are coded as hiding cross-border reverse mergers. Also, from Capital IQ we are able to code each firm's auditor as recorded on each year's company filings given to the SEC.
Second, we gather financial data on the reverse mergers. We collect information on both the U.S.-incorporated companies before and after the reverse merger, as well as on the foreign operating companies before and after the reverse mergers. Financial data include information on ROA, ROE, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and the log of total assets. We will also rank the ROA observations by percentile for one particular analysis. The financial data are compiled from Capital IQ, Thomson ONE, Worldscope, and Osiris. The foreign companies usually are not reporting to the SEC prior to the merger because they do not trade on a U.S. stock exchange. After the merger, however, these firms typically report 2-3 years of financials on form 8-K, so the database includes financial data for both the U.S. (shell) company and the foreign firm prior to the merger. The pre-merger financials for the foreign companies come exclusively from Capital IQ, whereas all other financial data comes from Capital IQ, unless Capital IQ shows a missing value, in which case we completed our database using financial data from Thomson Reuters. Unless otherwise stated, our analysis in the tables focuses on the U.S.-incorporated parent company post-reverse merger.
Third, we gather data on formal enforcement outcomes. For firms suspended from major U.S. exchanges, we gather the date of the suspension, the SEC release number, and the company name from the SEC's trading suspensions webpage. 3 We then find the central index key for each company and used it to match the suspended firms to firms in our dataset. From the SEC's online library of enforcement actions, we also collect data on when firms were subject to SEC initiated litigation. Also, from the SEC online library of comment letters sent to companies from Fourth, we examine the magnitude of problematic accounting by these reverse merger firms. We first use total accruals as a proxy for the use of managerial discretion (Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2011) . Total accruals is calculated as (Δ Current Assets -Δ Cash) -(Δ Current
Liabilities -Δ Current Debt -Δ Tax Payable) -Δ Depreciation. Δ presents change year over year.
If information was missing the change was assumed to be zero. Many companies in the sample do not report taxes as a line item because they do not pay any taxes. We require that a company have at least two non-zero/missing inputs in the equation to be included in the accruals regression analysis. Consistent with prior accounting literature, we also divide accruals by operational cash flows as an alternative measure. We also utilize two other related measures of earnings management through accruals, which together measure how well accruals map into cash flow realizations (Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Wysocki (2009) ). First, we use OLS regression to predict changes in working capital using cash flows:
where CFO is operating cash flow, and ∆ is change in working capital (accruals) using the cash flow method. Following Wysocki (2009) ; a value of 3 to the top 11-50 firms; a value of 2 to top 51-100 firms; a value of 1 to firms that ranked outside top 100 but are not trivially small; and finally a value of 0 to those trivially small accounting firms.
We define an accounting firm as trivially small when it has less than 4 partners and/or less than 5 professional staff members.
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For firms for which we cannot find information from PCAOB, we search online to identify their staff size. For those firms that are too small to have a website, we also categorize them as trivially small, even though we do not have information regarding their partner number or the size of professional staff.
Sixth, we use a set of control variables on country-level institutions to see if they explain differences in reverse merger outcomes. We use the Voice and Accountability index from the World Bank World Governance Indicators project (Kaufmann et al., 2010) ; along with the public enforcement of securities law index from Djankov et al. (2008) .
Seventh, we use the following two controls for home-country wealth and economic dynamism. From the World Development Indicators, we utilize GDP per capita in 2000 constant dollars and then take the natural log. From that same source, we utilize the gross national income.
Either, we use a set of control variables meant to distinguish Chinese provinces from each other by their institutional quality. The source is NERI INDEX of Marketization of China's Provinces compiled by Fan and Wang (2009) . The index characterized the progress of transition towards market economy for 31 provinces and regions in China. The index has a total of 23 subcomponents that cover five general areas --1) market and government relationships; 2) development of the non-state enterprise sector; 3) development of the commodity market; 4) development of the factor markets; and 5) market intermediaries and the legal environment for the market. The index is constructed based on governmental statistics such as the share of 5 We also tried an alternative specification by collapsing the last two categories and our empirical results do not change in any substantive way.
government budgetary expenses in gross domestic product and the judgment of 4000 company leaders from enterprise surveys. We focus on their ranking of the overall institutional environment in each province, which is the average score across the five subcomponents.
IV.B Models
We run a series of regressions to test the relationship between reverse merger timing, auditor reputation, and corporate governance. In Table 5 , we first use a panel logit regression to model the selection of auditors of different reputation as a function of the particular firm's reverse merger timing, its total assets, and pre-merger auditor choice. We also control the regulatory environment in the U.S. as well as home country economic conditions. We further add year dummies to control for time-period effects. We next link a firm's auditor choice to its lateness of SEC-mandated disclosure and run a series of panel logit regressions in which a firm's lateness of SEC-mandated disclosure is a function of auditor rank, the year when the particular firm's reverse merger took place, the U.S. regulatory environment, the log of the firm's total assets, home country's economic conditions as well as time-period effects. Thus, our basic models are
where AuditorChoicekt represents the reputation of firm k's chosen auditor at time t and
LatenessOfSEC MandatedDisclosurekt alternatively presents the particular firm k's Late-Filed
Annual Report to the SEC at time t, or Anything Filed Late to the SEC at time t.
ReverseMergerYeark represents the year when the particular firm k's reverse merger took place.
PreMergerUseOfBigFourk presents if firm k ever used a big four as an auditor before its entry into the U.S. financial market through reverse merger. USRegulationControl t presents the change of the regulatory environment in the US financial market due to the pass of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
2002.
HomeCountryEconomicControls kt presents two home-country controls: a) the log of homecountry GDP per capita; and b) the growth-rate of home-country GDP.
In Table 6 , we run the first and second models described above and add to it a series of further country-level institutional control variables. We also take the two models above and focus just on the Chinese reverse mergers, with the ability thus to include controls for the varying quality of Chinese province-level institutions.
In Table 7 , we examine the location choice of the reverse merger firms to see if there is anything special about Nevada in terms of who borrows/adopts Nevada's corporate law, what is the auditor choice for these same firms, and what is the resulting lateness of filing SECmandated disclosures. We estimate three models
Where Nevada k is a dummy measuring if a firm selected to engage in reverse merger with a shell company that was incorporated in Nevada. In Table 8 , we examine the correlation between entry timing, auditor reputation and SEC comment letters. When the SEC wants to ask questions about a company's SEC filing, it sends the company a comment letter. Such comment letters are now publicly available on the Internet for the time since August 1, 2004. We look at three set of outcome variables, measuring the number of SEC letters a firm received, the type of SEC letters that a firm received and the nature of the SEC comment that a firm received. Thus, we estimate
where SECLetterkt is alternatively the count of letters sent by the SEC to firm k at time t ( In Table 9 , we examine the correlation between entry timing, auditor reputation and firm's earnings management. We estimate
where EarningsManagementkt alternatively represents firm k's total accrual at time t (Models 1 & 2), Accruals over Operations at time t (Models 3 & 4), and Accrual Quality at time t (Models 5 & 6).
V. Results
We first examine the time at which cross-border reverse mergers into the U.S. began and when their number most increased in frequency. We show in Table 1 We next look in Table 1 at the main foreign country of business operation for each reverse merger. Clearly, the overwhelming majority of reverse mergers come from Canada (347 out of 858 total cases) and China (295 out of 858 total cases). While not shown in Table 1 , we can also point out that the remaining 216 cases are from a diverse set of countries, consisting of both developed and emerging economies. Thus, it is interesting how the majority of cases involve Canada and China, although a range of different countries has nontrivial participation in the market for cross-border reverse mergers as well. We have asked at this point why China and Canada should be so prevalent. In the market for cross-listings, these are two of the most important countries, and to the extent that the cross-border market for reverse mergers does in fact involve some firms looking to commit fraud, it is worth noting the prevalence of Canada among the cases of severe corporate governance scandals involving cross-listed firms in the U.S. (Siegel, 2005) .
Next, given that foreign companies can freely choose which of the U.S. states' corporate law to rent, we next examine in Table 1 Barzuza (2011) ). Nevada and Delaware are followed by a set of many states with only a small number of reverse mergers each.
Next, it is useful to ask how many of these open reverse merger cases involving also renting U.S. securities law via a major U.S. stock exchange listing. We find in Table 1 that 37 of the 858 reverse merger cases involve also a stock listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Of those 37, 23 involve NASDAQ. What is interesting is that nearly all of these firms are accessing the U.S. capital market (a small portion are missing any data on their past capital market access), but they are doing so mostly through the so-called Pink Sheets (753 of 858 cases).
Then, we examine the prevalence of formal enforcement actions and trading suspensions as well as their country origins. 6 We first find that trading suspensions among the listed exchange set have been numerous (22 out of 37) (see Table 2 ). Of the reverse merger sample, seven have been the subject of an SEC enforcement action while 15 have been the subject of a private lawsuit (with at least some overlap across those two subsets). These enforcement actions and trading suspensions occur once per firm. What is striking, as shown in Table 2 , is that the majority of the trading suspensions and a plurality of the SEC actions involve Canadian firms, whereas a majority of the private lawsuits involve Chinese firms. Whether this is due to the weak ability of the SEC to enforce the law when it involves evidence gathering in China is something we intend to research further. What is at first glance striking is that six out of 22 trading suspension cases, two out of seven SEC litigation cases, and eight out of 15 private litigation cases where the state of incorporation is known, involve Nevada. These statistics, however, are not significantly out of line with Nevada's proportion of total reverse mergers.
In Table 3 we see the names and country origins of the companies subject to these trading suspensions, SEC litigation actions, and private lawsuits. What is most striking is how the three lists do not overlap much at all. Oftentimes, the private litigants have been shown to pursue redress where the SEC has failed to act in severe fraud cases (Siegel, 2005) . So that latter pattern
is consistent with what is previously known about private lawsuits.
Next, we examine which auditors are most commonly involved with cross-border reverse mergers. As seen in Table 4 , two of the top three are Big Four firms KPMG and Ernst & Young. But the overall list shows a highly fragmented industry structure for auditors in the cross-border reverse merger space. Among these auditors are numerous very small accounting firms (with fewer than 11 partners or 31 total employees in the majority of cases, and with fewer than six partners or 11 total employees in a large proportion of cases).
Then we look at what predicts the choice of a quality auditor. We rank the auditors from 0 to 5, with the Big Four assigned a value of 5 and the others ranked below them by size. We find in Table 5 that the choice of a larger and/or more reputable auditor is negatively correlated with reverse merger year. In other words, the early pioneers of reverse mergers were significantly more likely to select a larger and/or more reputable auditor than the later cases.
These results are robust to different specification of auditor ranking, such as collapsing the bottom two categories together 7 , categorizing firms into two categories only (i.e. either the Big Four vs. the rest or the small ones vs. the rest), or splitting the samples into open and hiding reverse merger subsamples. We also examine the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and find no evidence that firms are more likely to select reputable auditors in the era of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Foreign operating firms that used the Big Four before the reverse merger are likely to still use the Big Four Four after the reverse merger, although this fact does nothing to take away the reverse merger year result reported above. We also controlled for firm size and find as expected that larger firms are more likely to hire more reputable auditors.
Next, we ask the question: are the so-called pioneers of reverse mergers less likely to issue their required annual reports late to the SEC? Indeed, we find that to be the case in Panel B of Table 5 . (This marked progression in late filing by later reverse merger cohorts is at the same powerfully illustrated in Figure 1 .) At the same time, firms with more reputable auditors 7 These results are available in a separate appendix from the authors.
are significant less likely to be late filers of their SEC-mandated annual reports. They are also less likely to file anything late to the SEC. The results above are shown to be robust to including country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country*Big 4 auditor fixed effects in Table 8c .
Then we examine the effect of country-level institutions on governance outcomes. As seen in Panel A of Table 6 , firms from countries ranking higher on the World Bank's Voice and Accountability index tend to be more likely to hire a Big Four auditor. As seen in Panel B of the same table, firms from countries with higher public enforcement of securities laws tend to be more likely to hire a Big Four auditor. When restricting the analysis temporarily to Chinese reverse mergers in Panel C of Table 6 , we find that within-China institutional differences matter to some extent. Chinese firms from Chinese provinces with better overall institutions on the NERI index were less likely to issue late annual reports or to issue late filings of any type to the SEC, although they were no more or less likely to choose large and/or more reputable auditors.
The overall story is that home-market institutions continue to matter in explaining governance outcomes, even for the firms that are borrowing U.S. state-level corporate law. That said, we plan to research whether certain state laws lead to better governance outcomes than are the norm for home-country peer firms.
We go on to examine whether there is anything special about Nevada in terms of who borrows/adopts Nevada's corporate law, what is the auditor choice for these same firms, and what is the resulting lateness of filing SEC-mandated disclosures. As seen in Table 7 , we find that Canadian firms are significantly more likely to borrow Nevada corporate law. Interestingly, the Chinese firms are choosing a diverse range of states to do a reverse merger, whereas the Canadian firms are overwhelmingly picking Nevada. At the same time, there is no significant association between Nevada and choice of a reputable auditor. That said, as seen in Figure Next, we take advantage of the fact the since 2004 the SEC has publicly released the comment letters it sends to companies asking for more information on their stated disclosures.
As shown in Table 8 , we find that the one significant variable is the year of the reverse merger.
Later reverse cohorts are more likely to get into early trouble with the SEC, both in terms of the number of letters they receive and on the diverse range of content dimensions reported by the SEC. Not every single dimension is statistically significant for these later reverse merger cohorts, but most dimensions are, from issues in their registration to disclosures of risk to disclosures about their operations-simply to mention a few).
Lastly, we test to see whether the reverse merger companies display problematic accounting (as proxied by the use of accruals)? As shown in Table 9 , the key finding is that problematic accounting among these reverse merger firms is primarily a function of whether they use a Big Four accounting firm as their auditor or not. Those using a Big Four accounting firm making significantly smaller use of accruals.
VI. Further Discussion and Conclusion
It is worth emphasizing that the firms who pioneered the practice could well be of generally higher quality than the firms that come after them. But this is secondary to the fact that the institutions are supposed to bond even the lesser-quality firms and provide something in the order of uniform adherence to certain basic rules of the game. Yet the data shows that the formal rules do not lead to anything like uniform adherence. If anything, choosing a Big Four auditor becomes less prevalent over time. Those choosing a Nevada incorporation are even more likely to go without a Big Four auditor over time. Also, the prevalence of late filing of reports to SEC is increasing over time (and particularly for firms that do cross-border reverse mergers in more recent years).
Our ongoing work is to test whether the capital market was slow to distinguish among these cross-border reverse merger firms who openly report whether they have hired a Big Four auditor and/or incorporated in Nevada. If the capital market is found to be slow to distinguish among these firms, then perhaps it because is the capital market is otherwise cut off from full access to investment growth opportunities in China and believes that at least some of the Chinese reverse mergers are legitimate. Or perhaps the capital market in the U.S. is simply not as dominated by the so-called smart money as is frequently believed. Or perhaps the U.S. capital market, seeing that U.S. securities law does a decent job for U.S. firms, believes that it must also have similar effectiveness for non-U.S. firms, but must learn over time that it does not.
In summary, we find that cross-border reverse mergers have been a growing phenomenon since 1996, with the fastest growth in the years subsequent to 2003. Over that time, the majority of so-called open reverse mergers have taken place in Nevada, and a growing proportion has gone without the services of a Big Four auditor. Over that same time, the percentage of late filings to the SEC has increased dramatically. Having a Big Four auditor is associated with better economic and governance outcomes. Overall, the story is consistent with reputational bonding, by which some firms voluntarily to choose to follow a weakly enforced law while others appear to exploit the weak formal enforcement.
1 Note: * Other than Canada and China, the other most home countries/regions are Hong Kong (with 37 firms), Great Britain (29), Israel (20), Australia (10), Germany (10), Taiwan (8), Mexico (7), India (7), Japan (6), Russia (5). The rest come from a diverse range of other emerging as well as developed economies. ** We believe that, among the 57 reverse mergers firms not listed above as major-exchange-traded or OTC-traded, most if not all of the 68 traded once in the past on the OTC but have not yet found historical trading data on them.
2 There are a total of 344 accounting firms represented in our data set. A "case" refers to an instance of auditing at the firm-year level. Firms marked with * either have fewer than 11 partners OR fewer than 31 employees; Firms marked with ** either have fewer than 6 partners OR fewer than 11 employees. Panel A demonstrates through regressions the association between the timing of a firm's reverse merger and its selection of reputable auditors after accounting for a batter of alternative explanations. GDP per capita is in constant year-2000 US Dollar from the World Development Index and the natural logarithm is used; GDP Growth rate is from the World Development Index. A dummy is included to capture the pass of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and all post-2002 observations are coded as 1. Another dummy is included to capture if a firm had used a big four accounting firm before the reverse merger. Model 1 is an ordered logit regression where the dependent variable is auditor status (0 -5) for which a higher value indicates higher reputation. Model 2 is a logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the auditor was one of the Big Four. Model 3 is also a logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the auditor was a trivially small accounting firm. We define an accounting firm as trivially small when it has less than 4 partners or less than 6 professional staff members. For accounting firms that are too small to have a website, we also categorize them as trivially small, even though we do not have information regarding their partner number or the size of professional staff.
Panel B presents the results of logit regressions on suspect corporate governance. In Models 1-4, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the firm filed annual report late to the SEC. In Models 5-8, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the firm filed anything late to the SEC. Country dummies and Country*Big4 interactions included for models 3 and 7, but only for countries where the Big Four accounting firms were observed in the data. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels of two-tailed test: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Panels A and B examines how home country institutions influence a firm's auditor selection and suspect corporate governance. Voice and accountability index captures perception of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. The measure comes from the World Bank Governance Indicators project. The public enforcement index captures the intensity of legal regulation of self-dealing transactions and the measure comes from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) . In these panels, both GDP Growth rate and GDP per capita (in constant year-2000 US Dollar) data are from the World Development Index.
Panel C looks at the Chinese cases and examines how home province institution influences a firm's auditor selection and suspect corporate governance. We use the NERI Index of Marketization of China's Provinces (Fan and Wang 2009 ) which has a total of 23 subcomponents that cover five general areas --1) market and government relationships; 2) development of the non-state enterprise sector; 3) development of the commodity market; 4) development of the factor markets; and 5) market intermediaries and the legal environment for the market. We focus on their ranking of the overall institutional environment in each province, which is the average score across the five subcomponents. GDP growth rate and GDP per capital data are from the China Statistical Yearbooks.
In all three panels, Model 1 is an ordered logit regressions where the dependent variable (DV) measures the reputation (from 0 to 5) of the selected auditor. Models 2-5 are logit regressions where the DVs are dummies. In Model 2, the DV equals one when the auditor was a Big Four. In Model 3, the DV equals one when the auditor was trivially small. In Model 4, the DV equals one when the firm filed its annual report to the SEC late. In Model 5, the DV equals one when the firm filed anything to the SEC late. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels of two-tailed test: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Model 3 is an ordered logit regression where the dependent variable measures the reputation (from 0 to 5) of the selected auditor. Models 4 -9 are logit regressions. In Model 4, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the auditor was among the Big Four accounting firm. In Model 5, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the accounting firm was trivially small. In Models 6-7, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the firm filed its annual report to the SEC late. In Model 8-9, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one when the firm filed anything to the SEC late. Robust standard errors are presented below the coefficients for Models 1-2 and robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented below the coefficients for Models 3-9. Asterisks denote significance levels of two-tailed test: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. is the number of letters sent by the SEC to the company in the given year. Models 2 -11 are logit regressions. In Model 2, the dependent variable is a dummy marking companies that received more letters from the SEC than 75% of all filers. Models 3 and 4 examine the type of SEC comment and the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm receives SEC comment on press release (on 8-K or 6-K) and registration statement respectively. Models 5-11 examine the nature of the SEC comments. In Model 5, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm received letters from the SEC that commented on the corporate governance practices of the company, its internal controls, incorporation and chart, and etc. In Model 6, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm received letters from the SEC that commented on business risks disclosed by the company and government regulations. In Model 7, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm received letters from the SEC that commented on accounting policies, accountants, and the opinions of auditors. In Model 8, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the firm received letters from the SEC that comments on the operations of the business, its strategy, geographic location, development plan and etc. In Model 9, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the company received letters from the SEC that commented on stock, shareholders, warrants, debt instruments, dividend policies, and other security-related issues. In Model 10, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the company received letters from the SEC that commented on compensation policies. In Model 11, the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the company received letters from the SEC that commented on mergers, acquisitions, private placements, business combinations and other deals with other companies. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels of two-tailed test: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. All the regressions have the following controls -firm's total assets, home country's level of GDP per capita, and GDP growth rate. For the consideration of space, the coefficients and standard errors for these control variables are not reported. Srinivasan, Wahid and Yu (2011) . In Models 1& 2, the dependent variable is total accruals. In Models 3 & 4, the dependent variable is accruals over operating, which is the absolute value of total accruals over the absolute value of cash flow from operations. In Models 5 & 6, the dependent variable is the difference between adjusted R-Square (4a-4b). In Models 7 & 8, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of residuals quotient (4b/4a). Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are presented below the coefficients. Asterisks denote significance levels of two-tailed test: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
